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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW
Ralph W. Johnson*
and
James M. Madden**

Suits in tribal courts against tribal governments and their officials
are increasingly common. Plaintiffs often claim tortious injury
or improper denial of contract and other rights. Defendants often
assert sovereign or official immunity in response.' The tribal judge
is faced with a major and fundamental issue: whether sovereign
immunity, which protects the government itself from suit, has been
"enacted" into tribal law or whether the doctrine is declared tribal
common law. Frequently, the judge must also decide whether a
similar tribal sovereign immunity doctrine shields tribal officials
who have allegedly acted outside their official legal authority, or
in a manner or under a law that is unconstitutional.
Tribal court judges have usually turned to federal and state
case law for insights into these questions, but have had difficulty
making sense of the non-Indian courts' jurisprudence. Sovereign
immunity is an exceptionally complex doctrine. The ancient origin
of the sovereign immunity doctrine is murky. It is cluttered with
historical concepts, such as "the King can do no wrong," which
are distinctly out of step with contemporary Indian views of the
role of tribal governments. During the past quarter century, the
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Washington.
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I. In general, on Indian tribal sovereign immunity, see FELIX COHEN's HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 318-28 (R. Strickland et al., eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as CotEN];
Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of JudicialError in Construction
of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, In Defense of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1058 (1982). None of these sources directly addresses the issue of immunity in tribal courts. On sovereign immunity in the federal and
state courts generally, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1984); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION § 6 (1965); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§§ 9.17-9.27 (2d ed. 1984).
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doctrine has undergone major reform; in many jurisdictions it
is now a mere shadow of its former self. Moreover, the basis for
its existence, in whatever form, has changed over the years. Tribal
courts and councils face the challenge of deciding whether or in
what form to adopt the doctrine.
In 1980 there were 117 Indian tribal courts, 23 Code of federal
regulations courts, and about 270 Indian court judges. 2 These Indian courts exercise jurisdiction over an area of approximately
70 million acres, roughly ten times the size of New England. The
tribal governments exercise broad civil jurisdiction over both Indians and non-Indians who live, work, play, own property in,
and travel through Indian country. Tribal councils have regulatory
jurisdiction over zoning, water rights, game management, taxation, building and health regulations, environmental management,
and most other subjects customarily covered by state or municipal
laws. Tribal courts exercise broad civil jurisdiction, hearing cases
on torts, contracts, property, administrative law, taxation, and
other areas of law within the competence of state courts of general
jurisdiction.
Civil lawsuits, once unusual in tribal courts, are now common.
Some of these suits are filed against tribal governments and others
against tribal officials. This is especially true since Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez.' There the Supreme Court held the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act' did not waive sovereign immunity of the
tribal governments in federal court suits against tribes for violations of the Act or against the United States as trustee for tribes,
except in habeas corpus actions. After Martinez, the principal
forum available to a party aggrieved by tribal government action
is the tribal court.
Only eighteen tribal court decisions have dealt with sovereign
immunity since 1978. Four were decided by tribal appellate courts,
fourteen by trial courts. The paucity of tribal court decisions on
sovereign immunity can be explained on several grounds. First,
although nearly all tribes have appellate courts, few appeals are
actually perfected. Unlike the non-Indian court system, few trial
court decisions are published. Second, of the appellate court decisions rendered by tribal courts, only the Navajo decisions have

2. 9 Indian Courts Newsletter, No. 2, at 7 (1983).
3. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
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been published on a regular basis.5 A few other Indian court opinions were published in 1978 and 1979 in the now defunct Indian
Court Reporter.6 Since January 1983, the Indian Law Reporter
has published tribal court decisions when they are available. Several
tribal court judges have also provided these writers with their trial
court opinions dealing with sovereign immunity issues.
Third, relatively few civil cases were tried in tribal courts before
the late 1970s. In 1978, Indian Courts and the Future reported
that "[c]ivil caseloads of most tribes are very small. Most are under
10 percent of the total caseload and the civil caseloads of only
a few tribes exceed 20 percent." That study predicted, however,
that "[c]ivil jurisdiction should increase substantially as judges
receive training in this area and start to feel more comfortable
with it."' In response to requests by Indian court judges, the National American Indian Court Judges Association (NAICJA) initiated its first civil law training program in 1977; similar training
programs have been offered in each successive year. Although no
reliable statistics have been found on the total number of civil
trials in tribal courts since 1978, numerous Indian court judges
report a rapidly increasing number since that date. These cases
now involve important issues of tribal government, including the
validity of elections of tribal officials, property use, water use,
lease rights, and personal injury claims (upwards of $100,000).
Prior to the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Indian court opinions were generally unpublished, but apparently few raised the
issue of sovereign immunity.9 (This author could locate none.)
This is not surprising in view of the obscure nature of the doctrine, the small civil caseload in tribal courts, the lack of legal
training of the judges, and the widespread assumption after 1968
that the Indian Civil Rights Act had waived tribal sovereign immunity in federal courts for due process and other civil rights
violations.
The paucity of Indian court sovereign immunity cases is also
explained by the differences among some Indians and tribes about

5. Reports of the Navajo Court.
6. Published by the American Indian Lawyers' Training Program. The same publisher
now provides tribal court opinions in the Indian Law Reporter, beginning with volume

10 in 1983.
7. "Indian Courts and the Future," Report of the NAICJA Long Range Planning
Project (1978). Published by National American Indian Court Judges Association.

8. Id. at 47.
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
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whether tribal courts should have the power to challenge tribal
legislative or executive actions. Some tribes clearly prefer different
means of dispute resolution. Tribes are not required by federal
law to adopt federal and state doctrines about judicial review and
sovereign immunity; some prefer not to. While judicial review and
alternative means of dispute resolution are beyond the scope of
this article,' 0 they are nonetheless relevant to understanding how
and why sovereign immunity issues are now arising.
An examination of the tribal courts' civil jurisdiction and
sovereign immunity decisions, and a review of the doctrine's origins
and purposes in federal and state law reveal the increasing importance of the sovereign immunity doctrine and suggest several options to tribal councils and courts in deciding which aspects of
the doctrine to retain. The article concludes that:
(1) The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not part of the con-.
trolling federal law applicable to Indian tribal courts, except where
trust property is involved.
(2) Each Indian tribe has inherent sovereign power to adopt,
reject, or waive the doctrine of sovereign immunity for suits in
tribal courts, except those concerning trust property. In such actions, only Congress may waive sovereign immunity.
(3) Where a tribal constitution or ordinance fails to address
sovereign immunity, the tribal court must decide whether the doctrine is part of the common law of that tribe and whether and
to what extent the doctrine should be limited by exceptions.
While sovereign immunity is widely criticized, both the federal
and state governments continue to retain certain aspects of the
doctrine. Indian tribal governments may find it useful to do the
same.
Sovereign Immunity in Tribal Law

Indian tribes have broad civil and criminal jurisdiction. The
exercise of tribal civil authority over persons and property on the

10. Alvin J. Ziontz has given the most comprehensive treatment to the issue of judicial
review in the Indian tribal setting. He concludes that "judicial review is inconsistent with
the traditions and the structure of tribal government and is likely to lead to disruptive
conflict," and that tribal courts "may encounter serious difficulties in identifying the re-

quisite boundaries of judicial review." He also notes that judicial review of legislation
has not been characteristic of most legal systems outside the United States and may not
fit the traditions or aspirations of some Indian tribes. See Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil
Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 1, 12, 15 (1979).
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reservation affects private rights and gives rise to potential actions against tribal governments and officials. These suits raise
the issues of sovereign immunity and of official immunity. It is
important, therefore, to understand the broad scope of tribal
judicial and legislative jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court continues to affirm that Indian tribes have broad civil regulatory authority over persons and
property on reservations. " As to Indians on the reservations, this
power is comparable to that of a state government. Many tribal
laws now include provisions on building standards, water pollution, game management, zoning, planning, juvenile delinquency,
family welfare, probate, and many other topics found in state
and municipal laws.' 2 Tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
is not as broad, but it is still substantial.' 3

11. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian tribes retain their
inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among
members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members [citations omitted]. But
exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government
or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes,
and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation [citations omitted] ....
Since regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of a tribe on lands no longer
owned by the tribe bears no clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal
relations [the tribe cannot so regulate.]
Id, at 564, 565.
The Court found here that the Crow Indians had not traditionally relied on fishing
for a livelihood, as distinguished from the tribes in Washington state who have historically depended on salmon and other seafood for survival. But, the tribes still retain some
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers of the tribe, such as over such consensual relations
as commercial dealings, contracts, and leases through taxation, licensing, and other means.
Also, the tribe retains inherent civil authority over non-Indians when their conduct "threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare
of the tribe." None of these were alleged here. Id. at 565-66. See also White Mt. Apache
Tribe v. Bracher, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980), where the Court said, "Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and territory."
12. Indian Tribal Codes, (R. Johnson ed. 1981) (microfiche collection), University
of Washington Law Library.
A review of the ninety-nine tribal codes contained in the above microfiche collection
illustrates the scope of tribal civil regulatory authority. These codes, especially the ones
that have recently been revised, tend to look like the municipal codes of large cities or
counties, both in size (500 pages or more) and coverage.
13. In Knight v. Shoshone Arapahoe Indian Tribe, 670 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1982),
the court held that tribal zoning applied to fee land owned by a non-Indian. In Cardin
v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982), the court held
that the Quinault Tribe could close a non-Indian-owned store on fee land for violation
of tribal health regulations. In Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
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Tribal courts have broad criminal jurisdiction over Indians,
although their power to punish is limited to six months and $500
for each offense.' 4 They have no criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.' 5
Thus, today's Indian tribal governments tend to look, act, and
exercise broad civil regulatory powers much like the off-reservation
governments of states, counties, and cities. Therefore, challenges
to the use of this regulatory power raise questions about whether
and to what extent tribal governments should receive the same
protection that the doctrine of sovereign immunity offers to their
nonreservation counterparts.
Congress has authority to waive both tribal sovereign immunity and the federal government's immunity as trustee for the tribes
in federal and state courts. For example, in the 1952 McCarran
Amendment Congress waived tribal and governmental immunity
in actions to adjudicate all water rights to a stream system. 6
No federal legislation waives sovereign immunity in tribal courts,
although Congress has the power to do so, especially in regard
to trust property. Congress has on occasion waived sovereign immunity of tribal governments in federal courts, thus allowing at

Indian Law. Training Program) 3025 (W.D. Wash. 1982), the court held that the tribe
could build and operate a sewer system for the entire reservation and require non-Indian
fee owners to hook up to that system. In Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen,
665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 314 (1982), the court held the bed of
Flathead Lake was owned by the tribe rather than by Montana, and that the riparian
rights of shoreline fee landowners could be regulated by the tribe for the economic security, health, and welfare of the tribe. In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F,2d
42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981), the court held that the tribe rather than
the state could regulate non-Indian fee owners using water on the reservation where the
stream originated and died on the reservation. However, in United States v. Anderson,
746 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1984), the court held that the state, rather than the tribe, could
regulate non-Indian fee owners' water use of tribally owned surplus waters from a stream
that originated above the reservation and continued to flow on below it. In Babbitt Ford,
Inc. v. Navajo Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984),
the court upheld a tribal law imposing liquidated damages on a non-Indian off-reservation
car dealer who repossessed a car on the reservation in violation of tribal procedural requirements. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), the Court held
that the tribe could levy taxes on non-Indian activities on the reservation. In United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), the Court held that the tribe could regulate a non-Indianowned tavern on fee land on the reservation.
14. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982).
15. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
16. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982).
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least one forum for suits by tribal members against their tribal
governments.' 7
Where trust property is held by the United States for the tribe
or for an individual, the Supreme Court has said that only the
United States may waive immunity from suit.' 8 The cases are less
settled on this rule's application to suits involving non-trust assets
of the tribes. The 1982 edition of Cohen's Handbook of Federal
Indian Law concludes that while tribes may have inherent authority
to waive their immunity to suit in their own courts, it is less likely
that a tribe can waive its immunity to suit in a state or federal
court without congressional authority.' 9 Tribal governments retain those sovereign powers not ceded in treaties nor expressly
taken away by federal law, nor necessarily inconsistent with overriding federal interests. Therefore, the power to raise or waive
tribal sovereign immunity, like taxation and other powers, should
remain as an inherent sovereign power. Recent cases support the
tribes' ability to waive their own immunity when trust assets are
not involved. In Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe,"0 the court
stated: "We believe the grant of power under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 is broad enough to encompass express waiver of sovereign immunity to suit when the ordinance,
as here, has been specifically approved by the Secretary of the
Interior."' In United States v. Oregon," the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit gave an even broader ruling, holding that
Indian tribes may consent to suit without explicit congressional
authority. The bringing of a legal action in tribal, federal, or state
courts is itself a waiver of sovereign immunity since it allows entry of a judgment against the sovereign. The court stated that
its decision was supported by precedent, 23 by federal policy favoring

17. See, e.g., Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1905, Pub. L. No. 212, § 1, 33 Stat.
1048, 1071 (1905). See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906).
18. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940).
No waiver of sovereign immunity by a tribe can bind the United States as trustee. Privett
v. United States, 256 U.S. 201, 204 (1921); Bowling v. United States, 233 U.S. 528, 534-35
(1914). Tribes cannot waive their immunity by contract in matters affecting trust property
without secretarial or congressional consent. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1982).
19. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 325. The early case of Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe,
66 F. 372 (1895), says in dicta that a tribe may not waive its own immunity from suit.
20. 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).

21. 617 F.2d at 540.
22. 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981).
23. Id. The court cited as precedent: Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391
U.S. 392 (1968); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
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self-determination, and by the need to encourage banks and other
business organizations to deal with the tribes, without the deterrent of sovereign immunity invariably barring prospective suits."'
An additional ground not mentioned by the court is the tribes'
broad powers inherent in their sovereignty.
Any waiver of sovereign immunity, whether by Congress or
a tribe, must be clearly expressed to be effective. In Santa Clara

Pueblo v. Martinez," the Supreme Court refused to find a waiver
of sovereign immunity in the Indian Civil Rights Act because it
was not "expressed unequivocally."
The Indian Reorganization Act

The Indian Reorganization Act authorized tribes to create two
separate types of entities.2 6 The tribe could organize itself under

section 16 as a government,2 7 with authority to exercise preexisting
powers of self-government. If the tribe organized as a govern-

ment under section 16,28 it could also organize a wholly owned
corporation to engage in business transactions under section 17.29
Tribes organizing corporations received a charter from the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. "Virtually all of the corporate charters con-

tain a 'sue and be sued' clause, waiving at least some of the immunity that the corporation enjoyed as part of the tribal entity." 30
These waivers, even though not explicitly authorized by Congress,
were recently held to be effective. 3' However, they are limited to

Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Fontenelle v. Omaha
Tribe, 430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1970); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d
517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966).
24. In United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981), the court found the
Yakima Tribe had waived its immunity in two ways-through a 1977 agreement and by
intervening in the lawsuit. Cf. Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. 436 U.S. 49, 58. See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 359 (1919). Cf. United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
The Supreme Court held in these cases that congressional waivers of the federal government's immunity cannot be broadened by implication.
26. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982).
28. See F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 326.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1982).
30. See Taylor, The Effect of Tribal Sovereign Immunity on Economic Development,
8 A SELF-HELP MANUAL FOR TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Native Am. Rights Fund
1982). The author was the attorney for the Colville Tribe in 1983, and he gives an informative analysis of the issues relating to sovereign immunity and economic development.
31. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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actions involving the business activities of the corporation. 32
A recurring problem is that tribal officials and others tend to

confuse the operation of the tribal governing body with that of
the tribal corporation. In some instances, the membership of the

tribal council is identical with the membership of the corporation's board of directors,3 3 and documents used by the council

contain the term "Incorporated," suggesting that the corporation is the one engaged in the activity. In such cases, the courts
generally hold that if the corporation takes the action, it can be
sued under the "sue and be sued" clause; but if the action is taken

by the tribal government, sovereign immunity bars suit. The immunity issue ordinarily turns on whether the plaintiff's business
relationship was with the corporation or the tribal government,

which is a question of fact to be determined at trial.3 '
The tribe may waive sovereign immunity in tribal court. An
examination of a number of tribal codes illustrates how different
tribes have treated the sovereign immunity issue in tribal
ordinances.
As sovereign governments, Indian tribes can adopt or reject

sovereign immunity either as a whole, or in some limited form,
or create waivers. No federal law requires any particular result;

the choice is up to each tribe.
Some tribes have chosen to deal with sovereign immunity in

tribal constitutions. Others have addressed it in legislation. Others,
without constitutional or legislative language, have left the matter

to the tribal courts. The variations among the tribes are similar
to those found among the states.

A review of forty tribal codes 35 shows that twenty-nine have

32. Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 455 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mont. 1978);
Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977).
33. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 157 n.13, (1973).
This should not broaden the consent provision, because congressional authority
for consent to suit is clearly predicated on the existence of two different organizations,
and is limited to business transactions [citations omitted]. Any action against the tribe
acting in a governmental capacity is beyond the scope of the waiver and should be barred.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 326.
According to Cohen, the most thorough analysis of this question in case law is in Atkinson
v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977). See also Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 455 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mont. 1978); Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Alaska 1978); 65 Int. Dec. 483 (1958).
34. See Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 522 F. Supp. 521 (D. Utah
1981); Colliflower v. Fort Belknap Indian Community Council, 628 P.2d 1091 (Mont. 1981).
35. These codes were selected at random from among the ninety-nine codes included
in Indian Tribal Codes, supra note 12. The forty codes examined include the following
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no provision concerning sovereign immunity.36 Eleven tribes expressly adopt the doctrine. 37 A common adoption clause provides:
"The tribal court shall have no jurisdiction over any suit brought

against the Tribe without the consent of the Tribe. Nothing in
this code shall be construed as consent by the Tribe to be sued. '"3' 8

Three tribes have codes that provide specific protection to tribal
officials but limit that protection to "the performance of their
official duties," thus impliedly denying protection when they are
not in performance of official duties. The Zuni, Colville, and
Cheyenne River Sioux tribal codes contain the following provision:
Except as required by federal law, or the Constitution of the

Tribe, or as specifically waived by a resolution or ordinance
of the Council specifically referring to such, the Tribe shall be
reservations: Acoma, Blackfeet, Cheyenne River Sioux, Choctaw, Coeur d'Alene, Colorado River, Colville, Flathead, Fort Belknap, Fort Hall, Fort Mojave, Gila River, Hopi,
Kiowa, Laguna, Lummi, Makah, Menominee, Muckleshoot, Navajo, Oglalla, Pine Ridge,
Port Madison, Puyallup, Quinault, Rocky Boy, Rosebud, Sac & Fox, San Juan, Santa
Clara, Sauk-Seattle, Sisseton-Wahpeton, Spokane, Standing Rock, Turtle Mountain, Uintah
& Ouray, Umatilla, Warm Springs, Yakima, Zuni.
36. Those tribes where no code provisions were found on sovereign immunity are:
Acoma, Blackfeet, Choctaw, Colorado River, Flathead, Fort Belknap, Fort Mojave, Gila
River, Hopi, Kiowa, Laguna, Lummi, Makah, Muckleshoot, Navajo, Oglalla, Pine Ridge,
Port Madison, Puyallup, Quinault, Rocky Boy, Sac & Fox, San Juan, Santa Clara, Spokane,
Umatilla, Warm Springs, Yakima. Two additional tribes, the Sauk-Seattle and the Turtle
Mountain, appear to have no code provisions on sovereign immunity; however, their personnel manuals contain provisions waiving sovereign immunity in certain situations (see
Moses v. Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51 (1980), and Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa
Indians v. Parisien, I Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-95 (1979)).
Other tribes may have personnel manuals or other regulations containing provisions
on sovereign immunity; however, these sources are not readily available in published form.
Anyone involved in a sovereign immunity issue on a particular reservation would do well
to make a careful study of the tribal code, constitution, tribal resolutions, regulations
of different committees, corporate charter, corporate minutes, insurance contracts, and
other sources. Any of these may contain provisions relating to the sovereign immunity
question.
Additional caveat: the volume "Indian Tribal Codes" was published in 1981. It was
difficult at that time to obtain precise, up-to-date copies of the codes, although most
of those published are probably accurate as of that date. Nevertheless, anyone working
on a sovereign immunity problem should examine carefully the entire official copy of
the tribal code and all amendments, especially since 1981.
37. Those eleven tribal codes adopting sovereign immunity are: Cheyenne River Sioux,
Colville, Fort Belknap, Fort Hall, Menominee, Rosebud, Sisseton-Wahpeton, Standing
Rock, Turtle Mountain, Uintah-Ouray, Zuni.
38. This provision is contained in the codes of the following tribes: Fort Belknap,
Fort Hall, Sisseton-Wahpeton, Standing Rock, Turtle Mountain. This provision does not
expressly provide immunity for officers and agents of the tribes.
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immune from suit in any civil action, and their officers and
employees immune from suit for any liability arising from the
performance of their official duties. 9
The Menominee code is the only one examined that contains
an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. This code, adopted at
the time of the Menominee restoration in 1973, provides:
The Tribal Legislature shall not waive or limit the right of the
Menominee Indian Tribe to be immune from suit except as
authorized by this Article and by Article XII of this Constitution.
The Menominee Tribe shall be subject to suit in Tribal Courts
by persons subject to Tribal jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing rights and duties established by this Constitution and
By Laws, by the ordinances of the Tribe, and by the ICRA,
25 USC Sec. 1301 and 1302. The Tribe does not, however, waive
or limit any rights which it may have to be immune from suit
in the courts of the United States or of any State. 4"
In Cudmore v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council,"' the tribal

court found a waiver of immunity in a code section providing
that "no security shall be required of ... [the] Tribe, or of its

officers or agency" when a restraining order is issued against it.
The court said this language waived sovereign immunity in injunction suits because such a clause would otherwise be unnecessary. The impact was lessened, however, because sovereign
immunity was unavailable as a defense in this case because it would
prevent the court from testing whether a tribal resolution was in
conflict with the constitution and bylaws of the tribe.
A tribal waiver of sovereign immunity may appear in some document other than the tribal code. In Loncassion v. Leekity, "2 the
court found a waiver of sovereign immunity in an agreement to
develop a law enforcement program between the tribe and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The agreement required the tribe
39. See the codes for Zuni, Colville, and Cheyenne River Sioux tribes, in Indian Tribal
Codes, supra note 12. But see Stone v. Somday, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Training
Program) 6039 (Colv. Tr. Ct. 1983), where the Colville Tribal Court allowed suit for
violation of rights protected by the Indian Civil Rights Act on the theory of Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that government cannot authorize or protect illegal acts in
excess of authority.
40. See Menominee Const. art. XVIII, § I. This provision was adopted at the time

of Menominee restoration in 1973.
41. 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6004 (Ch. R. Sx. Tr.
Ct. 1981).
42. 334 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.N.M. 1971).
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to be "responsible for all damages or injury to any person or
property . . because of wrongful conduct of its officers." The
court ruled this language constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. In two other cases tribal courts have found waivers of
sovereign immunity in personnel manuals.43
Current BIA policy is to include a clause in all contracts under
authority of Public Law 93-638"" requiring Indian tribes to obtain public liability insurance. The federal regulation implementing this policy provides:
Liability and motor vehicle insurance. (a) Tribal organizations
shall obtain public liability insurance under contracts entered
with the Bureau under... [these regulations]. (b).. . any contract which requires or authorizes, either expressly or by implication, the use of motor vehicles must contain a provision
requiring the tribal organization to provide liability insurance,
regardless how small the risk.4"
Insurance policies obtained by tribes under this regulation are
required to include a provision prohibiting the insurer from raising the defense of sovereign immunity if the claim is within the
policy limits. These provisions state that:
[T]he insurance carrier waives any rights which it may have to
raise as a defense the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit, but
such waiver shall extend only to claims the amount and nature
of which are within the coverage and limits of the policy of
insurance. The policy shall contain no provision, either express

43. Moses v. Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51 (1980); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Parisien, 1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-95 (1979).
44. See Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2206 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c) (1982))
which provides:
(c) Procurement of liability insurance by tribe as prerequisite to exercise of contracting authority by Secretary: required policy provisions.
The Secretary is authorized to require any tribe requesting that he enter into a
contract pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter to obtain adequate liability insurance: Provided, however, that each such policy of insurance shall contain a provision that the insurance carrier shall waive any right it may have to raise as a defense
the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit, but that such waiver shall extend only to
claims the amount and nature of which are within the coverage and limits of the policy
and shall not authorize or empower such insurance carrier to waive or otherwise limit
the tribe's sovereign immunity outside or beyond the coverage and limits of the policy
of insurance.
45. 25 C.F.R. § 271.45 (1986).
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or implied, that will serve or empower the insurance carrier to
waive or otherwise limit the tribe's sovereign immunity outside
or beyond the coverage and limits of the policy of insurance."
No federal court decisions have been found holding that
sovereign immunity has been waived in tribal court. A number
of cases that might have raised this issue were decided between
1968, when the ICRA was enacted, and 1978 when the Supreme
Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez4 7 held that the Indian
Civil Rights Act only waived sovereign immunity for habeas corpus
suits.
In this ten-year period lower federal courts held the ICRA impliedly waived sovereign immunity of Indian tribes in federal courts
and that injunctions and other remedies (besides habeas corpus)
were available to complainants alleging violations of their rights
under this Act. 48 These cases also held that before seeking relief
in the federal courts, claimants had to exhaust their remedies in
the tribal forums. 4 9 These suits were brought against tribes and
tribal officials and might have raised the issues of sovereign immunity and official immunity in tribal courts; however, only one
case has been found where these issues were explicitly addressed.
In O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 0 the tribal code

46. BIA General Contract Provisions, Pub. L. 93-638, Contract-Tribal Organization
(PNW 4-7-80 art. III, § 321(e)).
For a thoughtful analysis of the meaning of this language and problems raised by it,
see Mitchell v. Confederated Safish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.
TribalMemorandum of Opinion-SovereignImmunity, written by Evelyn Case Stevenson.
In Quam v. Thurber, (Zuni Tr. Ct., July 10, 1981), the court relied on tribal sovereign
immunity to dismiss a suit against tribal police for alleged tortious misconduct. The tribe
had obtained insurance to cover such misconduct under BIA regulations, but there was
no waiver of sovereign immunity in the insurance policy. As a result, the insurer stood
"in the shoes" of the tribe and thus was protected from suit by sovereign immunity.
The author is advised that the Zuni insurance policies have since been changed to include
a provision waiving the insurers' sovereign immunity to the extent of the policy limits.
Interview with Michael Taylor, attorney for the Colville Tribe, (July 18, 1983).
47. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
48. For a review of these cases, see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, id. See also
COHEN, 1982, supra note 1, at 324-28, 669-69; Johnson & Crystal, Indians and Equal
Protection, 54 WASH. L. REv. 587 (1979).
49. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); McCurdy
v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux, 482 F.2d 1140
(8th Cir. 1973); Jacobson v. Forest County Potawatomi Community, 389 F. Supp. 994
(E.D. Wis. 1974).
50. 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973). In most of the cases the issue was never presented
to the tribal court, so the sovereign immunity issue would not have arisen in tribal court.
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recognized sovereign immunity as a valid defense for the tribe.
The plaintiff claimed that a tribal court suit would be useless
because it would be barred by sovereign immunity. The court of
appeals rejected this view on two grounds: (1) that the tribal code
provision on sovereign immunity probably did not apply to this
particular claim, and (2) even if it did, the plaintiff would not
be unduly burdened by having to seek special permission from
the tribal council to file suit.
In all but one of eighteen cases where sovereign immunity was
an issue, the tribal courts applied the doctrine either as provided
by the tribal code or as an interpretation of the common law.
Only one tribal court decision rejected sovereign immunity as the
controlling law of that jurisdiction." Seven cases were from reservations where the tribal code expressly declared sovereign immunity
applicable to the reservation. 2 Two involved tribes that had
adopted sovereign immunity in personnel manuals." One involved
See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); Dry Creek Lodge,
Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653
(10th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Lower Elwha, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973); Daly v. United
States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th
Cir. 1973); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
The tribal sovereign immunity issue was not raised in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978). Mrs. Martinez was held to have exhausted her remedies at the tribal
level through presentations to the council, which in the peublo served the role of an appellate judicial body as well as a legislative body.
51. O'Brien v. Fort Mojave Tribe, 11 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6001 (Ft. Moj. Tr. Ct. 1983). Plaintiff O'Brien brought suit against the tribe,
and Chairperson Minerva Jenkins for back salary alleged due him because of wrongful
dismissal as Director of Health for the tribe. Defendants both moved to dismiss on grounds
of sovereign immunity. The motion was denied. After reviewing the early English and
American history of the sovereign immunity, the court concluded the doctrine was not
appropriate for the Fort Mojave Tribe, saying "the court rejects that adoption of sovereign
immunity as an affirmative defense and holds that the full range of court authority be
available to afford relief against tribal officials whose actions contravene the legal rights
of plaintiff." 11 Indian L. Rep. at 6002.
52. Stone v. Somday, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6039
(Colv. Tr. Ct. 1983); Miller v. Adams, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6083 (Intertr. Ct. App. 1982); Cudmore v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program) 6004 (Ch. R. Sx. Tr. Ct.
1981); George v. Colville Tribes Business Council, CV 84-402, (Colv. Tr. Ct. 1984);
Chapoose v. Uintah & Ouray Tribal Business Comm., Civ. No. 133-177 (Tribal App.
Ct., Ute Indian Tribes of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, Jan. 22, 1981), opinion on
reh. Nov. 23, 1981; Burnette v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, I Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51 (Rosebud
Sx. Tr. Ct. 1978)); Quam v. Thurber, (Zuni Tribal Ct., July 10, 1981).
53. Moses v. Joseph, I Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51 (Sauk Seattle Tr. Ct. 1980)); Turtle
Mt. Band of Chippewa Indians v. Parisien, I Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-95 (Turtle Mt. Ct. App.
1979)).
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a waiver of sovereign immunity in an insurance policy.5 Nine tribal

courts applied sovereign immunity under common law principles
without the aid of a tribal code provision."

Most of the tribal courts 6 that rely on the common law apply
the rule summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Dugan

v. Rank,57 permitting suits against government officials in two

situations: "Those . .. are (1) actions by officers beyond their
statutory powers and (2) even though within the scope of their

manner in which they are
authority, the powers themselves or 'the
5 s
exercised are constitutionally void.
Of the eighteen tribal court cases examined, seven held that
official immunity barred the particular suit.5 9 In all seven of these

cases the courts found that the individual officials were acting
within the scope of their constitutional and statutory authority

when performing the acts in question and thus were protected by
immunity.
In another nine cases the courts declined to bar suits for injunctions against tribal officials because the plaintiffs were able

to show, at least for the purpose of motions to dismiss, that defendants had acted unconstitutionally, or in violation of the tribal
code, or in violation of the ICRA.6 °
54. Mitchell v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes (Flathead Tr. Ct. Mar. 9, 1982).
55. Garman v. Fort Belknap Community Council, 11 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian
Law. Training Program) 6017 (Ft. Blkp. Tr. Ct. 1984); O'Brien v. Fort Mojave Tribal
Council, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6001 (Ft. Moj. Tr.
Ct. 1983); Satiacum v. Sterud, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6013 (Puy. Tr. Ct. 1982); Holy Rock v. Tribal Election Bd., 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6009 (0g. Sx. Tr. Ct. 1982); Grant v. Grievance Comm.
of Sac & Fox, I Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-39 (1981); Kiowa Business Comm. v. Ware, 1 Tribal
Ct. Rptr. A-45 (1980); Halona v. Macdonald, 1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-70 (1978); Flett v.
Spokane Tribe of Indians, No. 83-071-CV (Spokane Tribal Ct., June 15, 1983); Mitchell
v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, (Flathead Tri.
Ct., Mar. 9, 1982).
56. See, e.g., Burnette v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, I Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51 (1978).
57. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
58. Id. at 621-22.

59. Garman v. Fort Belknap Community Council, 11 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian
Law. Training Program) 6017 (Ft. Blkp. Tr. Ct. 1984); Stone v. Somday, 10 Indian L.
Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6039 (Colv. Tr. Ct. 1983); Satiacum v. Sterud,
10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6013 (Puy. Tr. Ct. 1982); George
v. Colville Tribes Business Council, CV 84-402 (Colv. Tr. Ct., May 9, 1984); Flett v.
Spokane Tribe, No. 83-071-CV (Spokane Tr. Ct., June 15, 1983); Quam v. Thurber, (Zuni
Tr. Ct., July 10, 1982); Grant v. Grievance Comm. of Sac & Fox, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr.
A-39 (1981).
60. Miller v. Adams, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6034
(Intertr. App. Ct. 1982); Cudmore v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, 10 Indian
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While several tribal court decisions have simply relied on the
brief rule stated in Dugan v. Rank,6 ' a few have articulated a
somewhat more comprehensive test of the exceptions for suits
against officials. In Moses v. Joseph,6 the court said:
[S]o long as the tribal officer was acting in good faith his actions are immune from suit. However [in spite of good faith]
two exceptions to the doctrine ,

. .

will be recognized by the

court.
One is when an officer's power has been limited by statute
The other

and his actions were beyond the statutory limits ....

instance.., is when he acts unconstitutionally or pursuant to
an unconstitutional grant of power. To incur liability for such
a constitutional tort the act must be one which a tribal officer
of average intelligence and knowledge would understand violates
the .

..

Tribal constitution.

This test was approved in Satiacum v. Sterud63 and Flett v.
Spokane Tribe,64 although the court in Satiacum articulated the
rule somewhat differently:
First, the tribe's immunity to suit shall extend only to persons
acting in their official capacity at the time the act

..

occurred.

Second, the officer must have acted in good faith to enjoy the
immunity. Third, an official shall be liable for acts that a
reasonable person would know were in excess of his or her lawful
authority.6

L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6004 (Ch. R. Sx. Tr. Ct. 1981); Moses
v. Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51 (1980); Kiowa Business Comm. v. Ware, I Tribal
Ct. Rptr. A-45 (1980); Turtle Mt. Band of Chippewa Indians v. Parisien, I Tribal Ct.

Rptr. A-95 (1979); Halona v. Macdonald, I Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-70 (1978); Burnette v.
Rosebud Sioux Tribe, I Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51 (1978); Mitchell v. Confederated Salish

& Kootenai Tribes, (Flathead Tri. Ct., Mar. 9, 1982); Chapoose v. Uintah &Ouray Tribal
Business Comm., Civ. No. 133-77 (App. Ct. of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, Jan. 22,
1981), opinion on reh. Nov. 23, 1981.
61. See supra note 50.
62. 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51 (1980).
63. 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6013 (Puy. Tr. Ct. 1982).
64. No. 83-071-CV (Spokane Tr. Ct., June 15, 1983).

65. 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6013, 6016 (Puy. Tr.
Ct. 1982). Injunctive relief against unconstitutional action or action in excess of lawful
authority is generally available wholly aside from good faith. There is no reason to allow

government action to go forward when it is illegal or unconstitutional, even though in
good faith. Recent cases permitting suits for damages against officials committing "con-

stitutional torts" have allowed the defense of good faith when the official can show that
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Presumably the officials would be individually liable for damages
if their actions were not protected by official immunity. In
Satiacum the plaintiff requested only an injunction; however, in
Moses the plaintiff asked for reinstatement of his job and pecuniary
relief. In Quam v. Thurber,66 the court, relying on the tribal code,
which prohibited suits against the tribe, barred a suit against police
officers as individuals because they were acting within the scope
of their official capacities and their actions were considered those
of the tribe (the sovereign). Presumably, if the court had found
the police to be acting outside their "official capacity," they could
have been individually liable for damages.
Tribal courts have generally chosen to follow the federal court
decisions, including those allowing suits against officials for acts
that are unconstitutional or outside the scope of their official
authority. Only one court, on the Fort Mojave Reservation, appears to have totally rejected sovereign immunity as the controlling doctrine. (This view must be deemed tentative as it is based
on only one case.)
Sovereign Immunity in the Non-Indian Setting
Tribal courts are not bound by federal or state common law
on sovereign immunity, nor by federal or state statutes waiving
or changing the doctrine in federal or state courts. Tribal courts
have nonetheless tended to rely on federal cases and to a lesser
extent on state cases and on standard non-Indian treatises and
articles for ideas, wisdom, and authority. Because of the complexity of the subject and the often limited library facilities available
to tribal courts, the history, development, and current status of
the doctrine in federal law and in selected states is summarized
below.
A distinction should be made at the outset between governmental or sovereign immunity, Indian or non-Indian, and immunity
of government officials. The former refers to the immunity of
the government itself from judgment, and the latter refers to the
immunity of government officials from suit. The two concepts
are closely interrelated but different.

he did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that his actions would violate
the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and

discussion of constitutional torts later in this article.
66. (Zuni Tr. Ct., July 10, 1982).
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HistoricalDevelopment of the Doctrine
The rule that the United States or a state cannot be sued without
its consent developed slowly in the nineteenth century as a tacit
assumption rather than a reasoned doctrine.67 The first mention
of the doctrine by the United States Supreme Court was in dictum
in 1834.68 Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[a]s the United States
are not suable of common right, the party who institutes such
suit must bring his case within the authority of some act of congress, or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it.' ' 69 In 1846,
Marshall's dictum became doctrine when the Supreme Court held
that a federal circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear an equity

action against the United States: "government is not liable to be
sued, except with its own consent, given by law."7 0

Five rationales have been proposed as the basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Justice Holmes created the most

widely known rationale in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,ll where
he stated that the doctrine rested "on the logical and practical

ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.""
Second, it has been argued that the doctrine derives from the
traditional immunity of the English sovereign: the idea that the

King can do no wrong. 73
Third, some legal authorities have argued that the doctrine of
separation of powers is the basis of sovereign immunity. Thus

67. The adoption of the doctrine by the states was also more tacit than express. One
of the earliest state decisions adopting the doctrine was Black v. Republic, I Yeates 139
(Pa. 1792). During the Revolutionary War, officers of the Pennsylvania state navy had
seized some provisions from the plaintiff's decedent to keep them from falling into the
hands of the advancing British; the plaintiff sought to recover from the commonwealth
the value of these provisions. The court asserted that it had no jurisdiction to hear the
case unless Pennsylvania had consented to be sued. No clear rationale for this rule was
announced.
68. United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
69. Id. at 443.
70. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846).
71. 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
72. Id. at 353. Holmes's argument has been criticized as too formalistic; his "logical"
ground ignores that the.government can and does make itself responsible for some of
its actions. See Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States
1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795, 799 (1966).
73. See, A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST 541, 548 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). For a detailed
account of remedies against the Crown, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
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the courts, as one branch of government, cannot enforce judgments
against another branch of government without the latter's con-

sent.74

A fourth rationale, which is now widely regarded as the most
respectable by courts and commentators, is that official actions
of the government must be protected from undue judicial inter-

ference.75

Finally, a rationale especially relevant to smaller governments

is that the doctrine prevents burdensome financial losses that could
seriously impair or destroy governmental operations. This rationale

is especially relevant for tribes because tribal governments are
weaker financially and have poorer revenue-raising capacity than

most non-Indian governments.76

Common Law Doctrines: Suits Against Federal
Officials for Nonmonetary Relief
Sovereign immunity protects the government from suit without

its consent. Under the early common law, public officers were
not protected by the government's immunity and were "answerable
as ordinary citizens for wrongs committed in the exercise of their
official functions, just as a private agent is liable for a wrong
done by him on behalf of or at the command of his principal.""
The officer could claim he acted under legal authority, and the
court had to decide that issue to determine personal liability. If

it found that the officer acted ultra vires, beyond his official
authority, then he could be held personally liable.
Federal courts still hold that sovereign immunity does not pre-

vent suits against state or federal officers who act either beyond
their official authority or in violation of the Constitution. The

74. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 478 (1793).
75. See, e.g., Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 57 GEo. L.J. 81 (1968). Reynolds gives three reasons for governmental immunity for discretionary acts. First, the doctrine of separation of powers requires that
some official acts be free from judicial oversight. Reynolds notes also that the possibility
of suit for every official decision would create an atmosphere of fear and impair efficient
governmental functioning. Second, Reynolds argues that courts are poorly equipped to
second-guess most executive or legislative policy decisions. Third, he suggests that broad
governmental liability in tort would create an unmanageable financial burden. Id. at 121-23.
76. "The principle of immunity from suit ... is of tremendous importance to Indian tribes" because of their limited resources, dependency on the federal government,
and modest taxing powers. See Ziontz, supra note 1, at 34.

77. B.

SCHWARTZ,

supra note 1, at 558.
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landmark case for this principle is Exparte Young,7" where the
Supreme Court, after first holding unconstitutional a Minnesota
statute providing for common-carrier rate fixing, went on to hold
that the state attorney general could be enjoined from enforcing

the unconstitutional statute.79 The Court reasoned that the attorney
general's enforcement of an unconstitutional law was without state
authority and did not involve the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity. This type of suit became known as the "officer's
suit."" ° Edelman v. Jordan' limited the Young doctrine by ruling that courts would enjoin future unconstitutional conduct, but
would refuse to award damages for past conduct by state officials.

The recent case of Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman2 modifies the rule of Ex parte Young even further.
Pennhurst was a suit alleging that state officials were violating
state law by maintaining poor conditions in an institution for the
mentally retarded and that such violations infringed on due process and other rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. The

court declined to issue an injunction, however, stating that to do

78. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
79. Although Young, id., was concerned with the extent of a state officer's immunity from suit, the reasoning has applied equally to suits against federal officers. As noted
by Jaffe: "no distinction has ever been explicitly recognized in the cases between suits
against state and against federal officers, since rationalization has proceeded in terms of
an abstract sovereign equally applicable to both types of case." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIvE ACTION 216-17 (1965).
80. From the beginning, the rationale of Young was recognized as a legal fiction
by which a suit purporting to be a personal action against a government officer was in
fact a suit against the government. By means of the fiction courts were able to exert some
power of review over administrative actions, a review that would be prohibited by a literal
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The fictional basis for the officer's suit led to conceptual difficulties. In the first place,
while a court could obtain jurisdiction by treating an officer's suit as one against a private
person, in finding the officer's acts unconstitutional a court would in most cases treat
the acts of the officer as "state-action." Second, the fiction led courts to refuse to award
specific performance of a state obligation. As the court explained in In re Ayers, 123
U.S. 443 (1887), if the defendant officer is stripped of his state authority when he offends
the Constitution, he cannot be sued for specific performance of the state's obligation.
Finally, the pursuit of rationality is strained by a fiction that forces judges to treat things
as other than they are. A conscientious judge who is unfamiliar with the vagaries of the
historical fiction will look at the reality and find that in fact the suit against the officer
involves the state. Thus, the memory of the fiction's original purpose, circumvention of
the immunity doctrine, has faded over time.
81. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
82. 464 U.S. 89 (1984).
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so would require the federal court to determine whether state officials were complying with state law, which is prohibited under
the eleventh amendment. 83
Before 1976 it was generally held that suits for affirmative relief
against the United States and against federal officials were prohibited, although the earliest case in this area seemed to uphold
the right of plaintiffs to affirmative relief. In United States v.
Lee,14 the court found that plaintiff Lee was the rightful owner
of land which had been taken over by the United States as a result
of an invalid tax sale. The court declined to allow the defense
of sovereign immunity in an ejectment suit because its use would
result in a taking of the plaintiff's property in violation of the
fifth amendment and would be unconstitutional. However, the
court ruled differently in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,S a case where the government allegedly took private
property. Holding that sovereign immunity barred the suit, the
Court said "if the actions of an officer do not conflict with the
terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions
of the sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general
law, if they would be regarded as the actions of a private principal under the normal rules of agency. ' 8' 6 But sovereign immunity
would not bar a suit against a federal official where he acted
beyond his constitutional authority. The Court noted that when
the federal official acted beyond his statutory or constitutional

83. The court also noted that the relief sought would have an impact directly on
the state itself. See 3 K. DAvis, AumqsT.ra'rw LAW § 26.01 (1958).
Acts that have been declared ministerial include the preparation of ballots, registration
of voters, recording and filing of documents, care of prisoners, driving vehicles, repair
of highways, collection of taxes, and dipping of sheep. See W. PROSSER, Torts 990 (1971).
The immunity of legislators, or judges exercising "legislative" functions, has been held
to prohibit suits for injunctions as well as damages. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Con-

sumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980). Prosecutors, on the other hand, are enjoined regularly under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
The duties of police officers are generally regarded as ministerial so that they are personally liable when they step outside their authority. However, police are not liable for
the execution of an invalid search or arrest warrant if the invalidity is not facially apparent. Police are also entitled to use reasonable force in the execution of searches and
arrests. Most suits for police misconduct are filed under the civil action provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
84. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
85. 337 U.S. 682 (1949). See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). These cases
are analyzed in SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 576-82.

86. 337 U.S. at 695.
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authority, a suit against a federal official may be dismissed as
a suit against the sovereign "if the relief requested cannot be
granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained
of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the
disposition of unquestionably sovereign property." 7 Larson was
heavily criticized."8 In 1976, Congress enacted a statute reestablishing and filling out the doctrine of United States v. Lee.8 9 This
statute, an amendment to section 702 of the Administrative Procedures Act, waives sovereign immunity when a federal agency
is sued for nonmonetary relief.9" When a particular suit does not
fall within the purview of section 702, Larson is controlling.
Suits Against Federal Officials for Monetary Damages:
Official Immunity
The question of whether to impose liability for tort damages
on public officers raises somewhat different policy issues than those
arising in suits against officers for nonmonetary relief such as mandamus, injunction, or specific performance. Suits against public
officers for tort damages are not considered a threat to the public
treasury since the officer alone traditionally bears liability once
immunity is found to be inapplicable. But such suits can impede
the "fearless administration of the law" 9' by causing public officers to be concerned more for their personal liability than for
the performance of public duties. This concern has caused the
courts to create the "discretionary-ministerial distinction."
The general rule is that public officers are not liable for civil
damages for "discretionary" acts, with certain exceptions. The
earliest cases recognized the need for discretionary freedom for
judges. Judges had to be free to decide cases under the law and
their conscience, or the judicial system would become ineffective.92
Courts gradually extended the immunity enjoyed by judges to administrative officers exercising judicial functions. 93 In Barr v. Mat-

87. Id. at 691 n. II(officials were attempting in good faith to carry out their official
duties).
88. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 580.
89. Administrative Procedures Act, § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1977). See infra notes 134-136
and accompanying text.
90. Administrative Procedures Act, § 10.
91. See, e.g., Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cerl. denied,
307 U.S. 628 (1939).
92. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
93. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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teo,94 this immunity was extended even further to include all
government officers exercising discretionary functions. As long
as the federal official acts "within the outer perimeter" of his
duties, he has absolute immunity, even though he acts maliciously. Furthermore, the immunity is not limited to high-level officers
but extends far down into the administrative hierarchy.
Discretionary acts are those requiring personal deliberation, decision, and judgment, as opposed to merely "ministerial" acts involving obedience to orders or the performance of a duty where
the officer is left no choice of his own. In providing immunity
for discretionary acts of public officers, the "discretionaryministerial" distinction promotes the "fearless administration"
of discretionary duties. This principle is especially important for
judges, legislators, and prosecutors. It has been applied to other
public officers on a case-by-case basis. 95
The rule concerning ultra vires acts complicates the "discretionary function" exception. The exception does not apply when
the officer acted outside of his jurisdiction or outside his official
authority. The officer is then regarded as not acting as a public
officer, although his conduct may be "discretionary." Confusion
can occur at the margin of this sub-exception; however, modern
courts generally will find an official act to be in excess of jurisdicis clearly no jurisdiction or authority over
tion only where there
96
the subject matter.
If a public officer is acting with proper authority and the acts
are "discretionary," the Court in Barr v. Matteo held there is
no liability even though the officer acts willfully or maliciously. 97
Despite the apparently unjust result as between a malicious officer and an innocent plaintiff, courts generally uphold the immunity of the malicious officer. The justification offered for the
rule is the ease of alleging malice by plaintiffs wishing to circumvent the immunity of the discretionary acts of officers. If officials
were forced to litigate whenever a general allegation of malice
is made, the purpose of discretionary immunity would be thwarted;
"the burden of a trial and ...

the inevitable danger of its out-

94. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
95. Officers to whom courts have extended immunity include the U.S. Attorney
General, parole board members, wardens of prisons, FBI agents, building inspectors, health

officers, and city mayors.
96. See DAvis, supra note 1, § 26.05 at 533.
97. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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come ... would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,

or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
duties. "98

Constitutional Torts
The advent of "constitutional torts" in 1971 substantially
reduced the scope of the immunity defense in suits against public
officers. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,99 the Supreme Court awarded damages
against narcotics agents for making a warrantless search of an
apartment without probable cause in violation of the fourth amendment. Eight years later, in Davis v. Passman,'1" the Supreme Court
extended the Bivens "constitutional tort" doctrine to all constitutional rights. Constitutional torts may include such actions as
simple battery, improper arrest, illegal detention, abusive treatment of prisoners, and seizure df property to satisfy a pretended
tax lien. Put simply, public officials who violate constitutional
rights might be personally liable to the injured person for
damages. "',

Under Butz v. Economou,' °2 most public officers who commit
constitutional torts receive only qualified immunity rather than
the absolute immunity available for nonconstitutional torts under
Barr v. Matteo.' °3 They are protected only where they act in good
faith, that is, where they did not know or could not reasonably
have known their actions would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.' 4 Butz opened the door to some of the liability
foreclosed by Barr because tortious official conduct can often be
framed in constitutional terms. Even where the immunity is lost
through lack of good faith, the plaintiff must still prove damages.'10
98. Judge L. Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1949).
99. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
100. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
101. For other examples of constitutional torts,see B. ScHwARrz,supra note 1,at 563,
and K. DAvis, supra note 1, at 170.
102. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
103. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
104. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US. 800, 818-19 (1982). In Harlow, the Supreme Court
modified the good faith standard of the qualified immunity defense, as enunciated in

Butz, by eliminating its subjective element. Harlow defined "the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms." The Court held "that government officials perform-

ing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."
105. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 427 (1978).
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Inverse Condemnation

Notwithstanding a prevailing rule of immunity, governmental
liability may be allowed in the action of "inverse condemnation."
This action is available only where a property interest has been
taken or injured and is derived from the constitutional prohibition against a taking of private property without payment of just
compensation. It is not applicable to bodily injuries. When the
government has taken private property in order to advance the
public welfare but has not initiated a formal eminent domain action to condemn the property, the private owner is entitled to
sue to compel the government to pay the just compensation which
would have been required in the eminent domain action.
The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits governmental taking of private
property without just compensation. This amendment is applicable
to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Nearly all of the states
have similar constitutional provisions. Many states have expressly

expanded their constitutional language to ban not only the taking
of but also the damaging of private property.'

6

The Indian Civil Rights Act also contains a just compensation

clause, which is binding on all Indian tribes.' 7 In addition, many

tribal constitutions contain just compensation clauses. In tribal
courts either of these provisions could serve as a basis for reject-

ing sovereign immunity as a defense in suits against tribal governments for the taking or damaging of private property.
Statutory Developments

It is clear that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has undergone
a marked decline over the past century. Not only have the courts
made major common law inroads into the doctrine, for example,
through "officers' suits," but Congress and the state legislatures
have consistently reduced its scope and importance. The reasons
for this decline include a growing suspicion that the doctrine is
rooted more in the principle of stare decisis than in logic or experience, and the conviction that it is unfair that the burden of
loss should fall on those persons injured by tortious acts or omissions of public servants. Often the doctrine is first limited or rejected judicially, then legislation is later enacted to deal with the
issue more comprehensively.
106. This discussion of inverse condemnation is based on S. SATO

772-73 (1977).
107. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
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Tucker Act
In 1855, Congress created the Court of Claims to hear claims
against the United States arising from contract or based on any
law or regulation. 08 As amended in 1887,09 the Tucker Act gives
the Court of Claims power to issue final judgments against the
United States that are not subject to the approval or disapproval
of Congress.
The key provision of the Act states:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded either upon
the Constitution or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of
an executive department or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort." 0
After the Tucker Act, there was a gradual but persistent congressional repudiation of the United States' immunity from suit.
While the establishment of the Court of Claims had made the
United States suable in contract to substantially the same extent
as a private person, attempts to provide similar rights to tort
claimants failed. Congress did enact a long series of statutes which,
in hodge-podge fashion, permitted limited tort relief for specific
types of claims. The number of private relief bills also increased,
especially with the advent of the automobile, until by 1940 about
2,300 private claims were being brought before the House of
Representatives every congressional term.' One of the primary
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 was to relieve
Congress of the heavy burden of considering these private bills." 2
Federal Tort Claims Act
The key provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted
in 1946."1 It provides:
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of
108. Court of Claims Act, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
109. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)-1491 (1982).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1491, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1982). The federal district courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims up to the amount of $10,000.
I1l. 86 CONG. REc. 12018 (1940) (statement of Rep. Celler).
112. Codification has distributed the statute rather widely. The Act is 28 U.S.C. §§
1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2402, 2441, 2412, 2671-2678, 2680 (1982).
113. Id.
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this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under the same circumstances,
but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for
punitive damages."' 4
[Jurisdiction is conferred on the federal district courts for
claims] for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." S
The Act contains thirteen exceptions to governmental liability;
two are of major importance. The first one is the so-called "intentional" torts exception. It excepts the government from liability
for claims arising out of libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,
or interference with contract rights. In addition, any claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process are barred unless these
torts were committed by investigative6 or law enforcement officers
of the United States government." t
The remaining exception to liability is both the most important
and the most problematic. This is the "discretionary function"
exception, which includes
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the government whether
or not the discretion be abused." 7
The first part of this exception is fairly straightforward and
has caused little litigation. It precludes actions against the government when federal employees carry out the directions of a statute
or regulation and act with due care. The purpose of this language
is to preclude testing the validity of a statute or regulation for

114.
115.
116.
117.

28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
Id. § 1346.
Id. § 2680(h).
Id. § 2680(a).
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acts or omissions of governmental employees who are negligent
or otherwise wrongful.
The second part of the exception-the "discretionary function"
provision-has spawned a great deal of litigation and commentary. It preserves governmental immunity when governmental
employees perform or fail to perform any "discretionary function or duty," regardless of whether they abuse their discretion
or are in some way at "fault." The root of the interpretation
problem is the difficulty in defining "discretionary" acts. Courts
and commentators have labored to find a meaning for "discretionary" other than the usual dictionary definitions. Judicial interpretations of the scope of the discretionary exception are extremely diverse and inconsistent." 8

118. The Supreme Court itself can be seen as responsible in part for the confusion,
based on two early decisions interpreting the Tort Claim Act. In Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953) and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), the Court
adopted two different, and possibly inconsistent, interpretations of the meaning of "discretionary." The Dalehite case arose out of the Texas City disaster of 1947, in which fires
and explosions erupted after the federal government had loaded ships with a fertilizer
containing combustible ammonium nitrate. Negligence on the part of the government was
alleged in adopting the plan to export the fertilizer, in controlling its manufacture, in
handling and shipment, and in failing to police the loading and fight the fire. The Dalehite
majority held for the government on all counts, giving a broad scope to the discretionary
exception of the Act. While deciding to define precisely where discretion ends, the Court
held that it includes more than the initiation of governmental programs, including also
"determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications
or schedules of operation." 346 U.S. at 35.
If the Dalehite test for discretionary acts is the oft-quoted statement that "[W]here
there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion" (id. at 36), the scope
of the exception would seem broad enough to include the action of a negligent mail-truck
driver in deciding to turn left in front of traffic as a discretionary act. However, the
majority also made use, somewhat vaguely, of what has since come to be known as the
"planning-operational" distinction. Interpreting the discretionary exception in the light
of this distinction is more helpful than merely treating every "judgment" as "discretion."
Decisions made in the planning stages of governmental action may be more likely to involve
policy decisions of which judicial review would be inappropriate. While it is clear that
not every "planning" act involves important governmental policy decisions, the planningoperational distinction is at least a start toward an interpretation of the discretionary
exception.
Indian Towing suggests a much narrower scope for governmental immunity under the
Tort Claims Act. The case involved a claim for the loss of a cargo that occurred when
a tug ran aground. The loss was allegedly caused because of the negligence of the Coast

Guard in the inspection and repair of an unwatched lighthouse and in failing to give warning that the light was not operating. The Court held the government was liable, stating
that although the Coast Guard was not obligated to operate a lighthouse, once it exercised
its discretion to do so, it was under a duty to use due care in its operation. This approach
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One leading commentator in the field describes the scope of

the discretionary exception as follows:
Government may possess discretionary authority to perform or
not to perform certain functions; but that should not immunize

it from liability where the functions are performed negligently
in circumstances where a private person could be liable. The

difference is that between planning and operation: the discretionary function' exception is limited to the policy or planning

level [the decision whether or not to maintain lighthouse service] and does not apply to the operational level [the failure
to keep the light in good working order]. "1 9
Civil Suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 gives individuals cause of action for damages
and injunctive relief against state officials who violate the individuals' constitutional rights under color of state law.' 20 Enacted
in 1871, section 1983 lay dormant for ninety years until in 1961
the Supreme Court gave it new life in Monroe v. Pape.'"' Since
Monroe, the number of actions under section 1983 has multiplied
has been characterized as analogous to the "good samaritan" rule in torts. If applied
strictly to the governmental immunity issue, the approach treats as "planning" or "discretionary" only the initial decision by the government to proceed with a course of action.
Thereafter, the government is liable to the same extent as any citizen. If so applied, this
rule may be too liberal in allowing suit against the government because presumably important policy decisions may be involved subsequent to the initial decision to proceed.
Thus, while the Dalehite approach treats as discretionary all but the most menial act,
the Indian Towing approach treats as operational all but the originating decision to proceed with the course of conduct. It has been suggested that lower court interpretations
of the scope of the discretionary exception can be analyzed as adopting one or the other
of these approaches. See Reynolds, supra note 75, at 103.

119. B.

SCHWARTZ,

supra note 1, at 571.

120. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
121. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Prior to Monroe, courts had refused to allow section 1983
suits when the alleged violation was prohibited by the state as well as the federal Constitution. In such cases, the plaintiff was required to exhaust state judicial remedies. The Monroe
Court held that "[t]he fact that Illinois . . . outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures
is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court." Id. at 183. The Court also held
that a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right need not be shown. Id. at 187.
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every year. In 1983, 38,162 suits were filed.' 2 2 The section is now
the principal statutory basis for police misconduct actions, including
the following actionable conduct: false arrest, false imprisonment,
illegal search and seizure, the use of excessive force, coercion,
and illegal interrogation.'
Section 1983 is also a basis for civil
rights suits in other than police misconduct cases, such as claims
associated with voting, jobs, accommodations, and welfare
24
benefits.
Local governments are "persons" for section 1983 purposes, 12 1
but states as such are absolutely immune. 126 Both the individual
offender and the responsible local government may be held liable
under section 1983. State legislators, prosecutors, and judges have
absolute immunity from damage liability for acts taken while performing their respective functions;' 2 7 however, judges are liable
for attorney fees in actions to enforce section 1983.128 All other
government employees are protected by the affirmative defense
of qualified immunity.' 29 The responsible governmental entity,
however, is not protected by the employee's qualified immunity
defense. 130 Nevertheless, local governments are not liable for
punitive damages. 13' Many issues remain unresolved concerning
the scope and meaning of section 1983.132
Suits for Judicial Review of Federal Agency Actions
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act gives individuals
122. See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 168.
123. See Littlejohn, Civil Liability and the Police Officer: the Need for New Deterrents to Police Misconduct, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 365, 412-13 (1981).
124. For a table showing the number of all civil rights actions filed in federal courts
each year from 1969 through 1978, see Littlejohn, supra note 123, at 370-71.
125. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruling the holding
in Monroe that only the individual who committed the violation was liable.
126. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
127. Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.
522 (1984).
128. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
129. See, e.g., Procunier v. Nararette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (prison officials).
130. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
131. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
132. Particularly difficult is the question of whether negligence is actionable under
seciton 1983. Courts have been apprehensive about allowing negligence as a basis for section 1983 liability would result in that section engulfing state tort law concerning government employees as defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that negligence
may be actionable under section 1983 if an adequate remedy is not available to plaintiff
under state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 164.
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a right to judicial review of federal agency actions.' 33 Under a
1976 amendment, the defense of sovereign immunity ordinarily
cannot be raised in these suits.' 3 Some authority exists for arguing that the 1976 amendments did not (and should not) totally
abolish the sovereign immunity defense in this context.' 35 It remains a difficult issue as to whether and to what extent this defense
is available in judicial review of federal
agency action under the
36
Administrative Procedures Act.
Of course it is exceptional, in any event, to find cases overruling agency actions in view of the judicial presumption favoring
their validity. Agency actions will not generally be overturned by
the courts unless they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in violation of some law or regulation.
State Statutory Waivers
Not surprisingly, the states are exceedingly diverse in their treat133. § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982), states: "A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Although this section creates
a cause of action for persons harmed by federal agency action, the section is not a jurisdictional grant. Instead, jurisdiction for actions under the APA is based on jurisdictional
statutes in the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1363. Most nonstatutory review actions
fall within the jurisdictional ambit of the federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)), or
mandamus statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
134. 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides in part:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages
and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed
to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed
nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that
the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named as a
defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the
United States: Provided, that any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the
Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance.
As Professor Davis says:
The meaning of the 1976 legislation is entirely clear on its face, and that meaning
is fully corroborated by the legislative history. That meaning is very simple: Sovereign
immunity in suits for relief other than money damages is no longer a defense. The
United States is liable in such suits as if it were a private party.
K. DAVIs, supra note 1, at 192.
135. See Comment, Sovereign Immunity: A Modern Rationale in Light of the 1976
Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 116.
136. Traditional administrative law principles accommodate cases involving important
governmental functions by disallowing judicial review of actions which are committed
to agency discretion. Arguably, the large and growing body of cases interpreting agency
discretion is a substitute for the sovereign immunity doctrine in administrative law.

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

ment of sovereign immunity. Some states retain a full-strength
doctrine of governmental immunity, while others have tried to
make the state fully liable in tort. This article does not attempt
to survey the laws of all fifty states. Of existing surveys, the most
current appears to be that published in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts,'" as updated by Professors Sato and Van Alstyne in
their 1977 casebook on state and local government law.' 38 That
survey shows that twenty-six states have abolished sovereign immunity, subject to "normal exceptions";' 39 eight states have partially abolished the doctrine;' 40 six states deem immunity waived
when the public entity is insured;'" and ten states retain the doctrine entirely. 42 These figures are now unreliable, however, both
because they are out of date and because of the difficulty in classifying the nature and extent of any given state's sovereign immunity
doctrine. It is clear, however, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the states has undergone a marked decline in the last
twenty years.
The status of sovereign immunity in four states, California,
Montana, New York, and Washington, illustrates the transitions
in the doctrine's application and the aspects of the doctrine which
were retained as necessary for effective government. New York
and California were selected because they are widely considered
as two of the leading states in legislative reform and judicial innovation. Montana is included because it went farther than any
other state in attempting to abolish sovereign immunity, and then
reversed its position at the next legislative session by reestablishing
aspects of the doctrine. The Washington legislature also went far
toward eliminating sovereign immunity in the tort area, but the

137.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 895(A) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).

138. S. SATO & VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 106.
139. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and the
District of Columbia. "Normal exceptions" presumably include immunity for judges,
legislators, police, and fire departments. The authors have added Montana to the list of

states, since Montana abolished sovereign immunity by constitutional amendment in 1972.
Also added in Virginia, which enacted a state tort claims act in 1982,
140. Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Tennessee, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Texas.
141. Georgia, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma,
142. Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri,
Ohio, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
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Washington Supreme Court judicially defined the legislation to
retain aspects of the doctrine, fearing as did the Montana legislature
that total elimination of the doctrine was unwise.
California. In California the tort liability of public agencies
and employees is wholly governed by statute.' 4 3 The impetus for
this legislation was a 1961 California Supreme Court decision'
that eliminated governmental immunity by making it clear that
no level of government in the state could rely on the "govern-45
mental" nature of its functions as a defense to tort liability.'
The legislature responded by enacting a two-year moratorium on
litigation of tort claims, pending a comprehensive study of the
issue. The study culminated in the Tort Claims Act of 1963.146
The 1963 Act identified several governmental immunities that
would continue. The most important immunity is for "discretionary" functions of government officials. ,41 Also immune were
adopting or failing to adopt a law, enforcing or failing to enforce
a law,I4 8 and prosecutorial activities, '41 police activities, fire protection, public health activities, and property inspection.' 5 0
Montana. Montana is unique in its approach to the problem
of governmental immunity in that the 1972 constitution completely
abolished the defense: "The state, counties, cities, towns, and all

143. See

CAL. GoV'T CODE

§§ 810-996.6 (West 1977);

CAL. GOV'T CODE §

815 (West

1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815(b), 815.2 (West 1977).
144. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961).
145. In concluding that "the rule of governmental immunity must be discarded" as
both "mistaken and unjust," Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, reviewed the erosion of the immunity of all levels of governmental entities which had taken place through
a combination of statutory and judicial developments. Id. at 213, 359 P.2d at 458, 11
Cal. Rptr. at 90. He pointed out that "in holding that the doctrine of governmental immunity for torts for which its agents are liable has no place in our law we make no startling break with the past, but merely take the final step that caries to its conclusion an
established legislative and judicial trend." Id. at 221, 359 P.2d at 463, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
146. The legislative proposals are contained in "Recommendation Relating to Sovereign
Immunity," 4 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n 801. These proposals were reinforced by a
factual study of the fiscal consequences of governmental tort liability which was made
concurrently by a legislative committee. Cal. Senate Fact Finding Comm. on Judiciary,
Seventh ProgressReport to the Legislature:Governmental Tort Liability (Reg. sess. 1963).
See generally Cobey, The New California Governmental Tort Liability Statutes, I HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 16 (1964).
147. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1977).
148. Id. §§ 818.2, 820.4.
149. Id. § 821.6.
150. Id. §§ 818.6, 821.4.
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other local governmental entities shall have no immunity from
suit for injury to a person or property, except as may be specifically
provided by law by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature.''I
This comprehensive action was greeted with alarm by one commentator, who envisioned "the paralysis of governmental functions while judges and juries deliberate the rightness or wrongness
of governmental undertakings."' 5 2 In the next session,'" the
legislature enacted limiting legislation that preserved four specific
kinds of governmental immunity: (1) immunity from suit for
legislative acts or omissions;'51 (2) immunity from suit for judicial
acts or omissions;' 5 (3) immunity from suit for certain gubernatorial acts;' 5 6 and (4) immunity for actions in good faith under
invalid or unconstitutional laws.' The legislation also put a
monetary ceiling on governmental liability,' 8 banned punitive
damages,' 5 9 created a comprehensive state insurance plan, and provided procedures for claims against public entities.
New York. New York was the first to legislatively allow claims
against the state.' 60 As early as 1876, a State Board of Audit was
established with power to hear all private claims against the state.
In 1929 a statute was passed that waived governmental immunity
in tort. The 1939 amended version of the waiver of immunity reads:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action
and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to
actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations,
provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this
6
article. ' '
151. MONT. CONST. art II,§ 18.
152. Hjort, The Passingof Sovereign Immunity in Montana: The King is Dead, 34
MONT. L. Rav. 283, 297 (1973).
153. The act is titled Liability Exposure and Insurance Coverage, MoNT. CODE ANN.

§§ 2-9-101 to 2-9-805 (1981).
154. Id. § 2-9-111.
155. Id. § 2-9-112.
156. The governor is immune for the lawful discharge of an official duty associated
with vetoing or approving bills or in calling sessions of the legislature. Id. § 2-9-113.
157. Id. § 2-9-103.
158. Id. § 2-9-104 limits damage claims to $300,000 for each claimant and $Imillion
for each occurrence.
159. Id. § 2-9-105.
160. For a history of governmental liability law in New York, see MacDonald, The
Administration of a Tort Liability Law in New York, 9 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 262 (1942).
161. N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8 (McKinney 1963):
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes

1984]

TRIBAL SO VEREIGN IMMUNITY

Because of the brief statement of the New York statutory waiver,
much was left to court decisions and some confusion has resulted
from the numerous cases.' 62 However, some immunities have
clearly existed, such as the immunity of legislators for legislative
acts and of judges for judicial duties.' 6 3 Policy decisions on what
constitutes adequate police protection have been held immune as
a governmental activity.'64 Also, state actions concerning inspections and the issuance of licenses have been generally protected
by immunity.' 65 A federal court applying New York law stated
that the test for governmental liability was whether in a particular
case it was desirable for courts and juries to become involved in
66
state and local administrative matters.'
Washington. In 1961 the Washington legislature enacted a
statute consenting to suits for damages arising from its tortious
conduct. As amended, the statute reads: "The state of Washington,
whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall
be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the
same extent as if it were a private person or corporation."' 67 This
statute is substantially the same as the New York statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity noted above, except that the Washington
version expressly repudiates the "governmental-proprietary"
distinction."'6 The statute was held to have waived municipal immunity as well. "69
'
In the first major decision interpreting the statute, the
Washington Supreme Court reinstated a broad range of governmental immunity in tort. In Evangelical United Brethren Church
v. State,'7° the court endorsed immunity for "legislative, judicial,
liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules
of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations,
provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article.
162. One commentator suggests that the inconsistencies in New York case law concerning governmental functions is attributable to the lack of statutory guidance and recommends a more detailed statutory approach. See Herzog, Liability of the State of New
York for "Purely Governmental" Functions, 10 SYacUsE L. REV. 30, 43 (1958).
163. See Id.
164. Bass v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div.
1972).
165. See Herzog, supra note 162, at 36.
166. Petition of Alva S.S. Co., 405 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1969).
167. WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1983).
168. Nevertheless, a subsequent Washington Supreme Court decision applied the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction. Hosea v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 678, 393 P.2d 967
(1964).
169. Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964).
170. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
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and purely executive processes of government, including ... the
essential quasi-judicial or discretionary acts and decisions within
the framework of such processes."' 7 ' As a test for determining
immune governmental actions, the court stated that liability could
not be imposed if the suit would bring into question "the propriety of governmental objectives or programs."' 7 2 Subsequent
Washington case law has
interpreted this test as a "discretionary
73
function" immunity.
It is clear from an examination of the state laws that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is far from dead, although to a considerable degree it is now being retranslated as a "discretionary
function" immunity. One commentator suggests that the principal
rationale of the new immunity doctrine is the need to prevent juries
or judges sitting as triers of fact from evaluating the policy decisions of public officials
made with the discretion given the of74
ficials by statute.
All of the four states reviewed retain three key immunities: (1)
immunity of legislatures for enacting or failing to enact legislation; 7 (2) immunity of judges for acts within their judicial discretion; and (3) immunity of prosecutors for charging or failing to
bring charges. These immunities are designed, in essence, to protect the highest functions of the three branches of government:
legislative, executive, and judicial. In addition, all the states except Montana have either legislatively or judicially preserved immunity for "discretionary functions" of government.
There is also general agreement on the need for immunity
relating to police and fire protection. While torts in the day-today functions of the police and fire departments should be actionable, broad policy decisions, such as how to allocate fire protection and resources, should not. Such policy decisions may be
protected by either a specific statutory immunity or by a legislative-

171. Id. at 253, 407 P.2d at 444.
172. Id. at 254, 407 P.2d at 404, following Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 31
WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956).

173. See Stewart v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 285, 597 P.2d 101 (1979); Loger v. Washington
Timber Prods., Inc., 8 Wash. App. 921, 509 P.2d 1009 (1973); Barnum v. State, 72 Wash.
2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967). The Barnum opinion stated the test for governmental im-

munity in terms of a "discretionary-operational"

distinction.

174. VAN ALSTYNE, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL.
L.F. 919, 975 (1966).
175. Immunity for actions in good faith under invalid or unconstitutional laws may
be seen as a corollary of this legislative immunity.
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ly or judicially created "discretionary function" exception to
liability.
Summary of the Sovereign Immunity and
Official Immunity Doctrines
This article has briefly reviewed the contours of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in the non-Indian courts and legislatures.
It is important to keep in mind that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is not a single whole. The immunities of executive officers are based on different considerations than those of judges
or of legislators. The types of facts necessary to apply the immunity are different in each situation, and the basis for finding
a waiver is frequently different. The scope of the immunity and
the rules for providing waiver of immunity reflect the defendant's
identity, the activity, and the relief requested.
At common law a distinction developed between suits for
damages and suits forrelief other than damages. In damage suits,
courts developed the "discretionary-ministerial" distinction, with
immunity granted for discretionary acts. The purpose of immunity for discretionary acts was to promote the fearless administration of the law. In suits for relief other than damages, for example, injunctions and mandamus, a general rule of governmental
immunity was broken only by the judicially invented "officer's
suit." Such suits were permitted against public officers who acted
beyond their statutory authority or in violation of the Constitution. Nevertheless, courts disfavored "affirmative relief" against
public officers, refusing to order any action that would have a
significant impact on the public finance.
The common law liability of public officers for tort damages
was traditionally very limited. Courts narrowly read the scope of
actionable "ministerial" functions. Because of the unfair results
of this doctrine, Congress and state legislatures enacted legislation waiving governmental immunity in contract and some torts
committed by officials in their ministerial capacity. Since the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, a majority of states
have waived their immunity in tort, retaining only certain key immunities; thus, absolute immunity has been granted to judges,
prosecutors, and legislators. A substantial number of states have
also retained, either legislatively or judicially, immunity for discretionary governmental acts. As a result, the modem doctrine of
governmental tort liability, like the older version, to a large extent revolves around the issue of the scope of discretionary
functions.
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The common law "officer's suit" in most states and in the
federal government has been supplanted by legislation regulating
judicial review of agency action. The model for this legislation
is the Federal Administrative Procedures Act. In theory, the scope
of judicial review of agency action is narrow under the APA: courts
can only overturn agency action that is arbitrary and capricious.
In reviewing agency action, courts often look to whether the action is outside of the relevant statutory authorization. In this
respect, modern judicial review parallels the officer's suit for acts
beyond statutory authority or in violation of the Constitution.
Sovereign Immunity and Indian Tribes

Federal law does not compel the use of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in tribal courts except in cases involving trust property.
Each tribe may choose to adopt, reject, or waive the doctrine either
by statute or judicial interpretation of the common law. Two competing interests must be weighed in the decision: the need to provide relief to persons harmed by government actions, and the need
to allow governments to make and enforce basic policy decisions
without constant threat of litigation from disaffected parties.
Several factors affect the balance and they vary with the nature
of the government and society's values.
The first factor is the relative weight the culture gives to protecting individuals from government power and to maintaining
the government's effectiveness and efficiency. For example, where
paternalism or reverence for authority is a cultural value, then
broad immunity may be more favored.
A second factor in weighing individual fairness and government efficiency is the government's size and resources. One
justification for government tort liability is the government's better
position both to prevent the harm through in-depth planning and
to spread the costs of loss over a broad basis. Thus, it is arguable
that it is fairer and more efficient to make a government rather
than the individual bear the costs of torts. But a small, undeveloped
governing body is less equipped to foresee and guard against harm
and to distribute the loss over a broad basis. Even if liability insurance is available, the size of a governing body will raise
economic issues that must be considered in determining a policy
on governmental immunity.
The relative strength and independence of the judiciary is a third
factor. Because the courts must hear and enforce any relief in
suits against the government, their ability to assert their in-
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dependence will determine the effectiveness of the relief. In a small
government, such as most tribal structures or most rural non-Indian
communities, a court that technically has the power to review may
be unwilling to use it because of possible political repercussions.
If the separation of powers of government is not fully developed
and communally supported, a court may be hesitant to effectively review the acts of other government offices. 7 6
If the balance is decided in favor of allowing suits against the
government, there remain questions of the kinds of suits to allow
and the boundaries of liability. As the state examples discussed
earlier suggest, the possible parameters of governmental liability
range from a detailed and comprehensive statute like California's
to New York's general statutory waiver of immunity, with the
details left entirely to courts' discretion. A third possibility, of
course, is to allow the courts the power to draw from the various
common law doctrines to create the desired degree of government
liability.
The best approach is probably one that combines the comprehensiveness of a statutory scheme with the flexibility of a judicially
defined doctrine. A "bare essentials" statute similar to Montana's
would be a good beginning.
Such a statute might include the following elements: First, it
could contain general declarations for tort liability of the government and its officers, for judicial review of certain nontortious
actions, and for governmental liability for claims based on contract or breach of law or regulations.
Second, the statute should list specific exceptions to governmental liability in tort. Absolute immunity should be granted to
legislators for legislative acts or omissions, to judges for judicial
acts or omissions, to prosecutors for acting or failing to enforce
the law, and for acts performed in good faith under the apparent
authority of an enactment later held invalid, unconstitutional, or
inapplicable. Other specific exceptions might include, for example,
immunities for fire protection and health care functions.' 7 7
Third, a "bare essentials" statute should contain a general test
for courts to determine whether particular acts are immune from
suit. The most obvious choice is the immunity for discretionary
176. See generally Ziontz, supra note 10.
177. The California Tort Claims Act is helpful in drafting these immunity provisions.
A book-length explication and annotation of the Act is A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA
GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY (California Continuing Education of the Bar, Practice Book
No. 24 1964).
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functions: absolute immunity of public officers for their acts or
omissions resulting from the exercise of discretion vested in them
by law, whether or not such discretion is abused.
The vagueness of the discretionary immunity need not be an
insurmountable problem if the purpose of the immunity is kept
in mind. As a guide for interpreting this immunity, the California Supreme Court stated:
In drawing the line between the immune "discretionary" decision and the unprotected ministerial act we recognize both the
difficulty and the limited function of such distinction .... A

workable definition nevertheless will be one that recognizes that
"[m]uch of what is done by officers and employees of the
government must remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry"
(3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) section 25.11; p.
484); obviously "it is not a tort for government to govern"
(Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)). Courts and commentators have therefore centered
their attention on an assurance of judicial abstention in areas
in which the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been
committed to coordinate branches of government. Any wider
judicial review, we believe, would place the court in the unseemly
position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government."'
Another California court listed three factors to help decide whether
a particular governmental function should be immune: "the importance to the public of the function involved, the extent to which
governmental liability might impair free exercise of the function,
and the availability to individuals
affected of remedies other than
79
tort suits for damages.'1
Fourth, the model statute should contain guidelines for review
of nontortious government action. Modern judicial review of
agency action under administrative procedure statutes is similar
to the common law officer's suit in that the issue is whether the
public officer has exceeded his statutory or constitutional authority.
178. Johnson v. California, 69 Cal. 2d 713, 447 P.2d 325, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248
(1968). The court held that the state was liable for injuries to the plaintiff caused by

a 16-year-old ward who had been placed for foster care in the plaintiff's home. The court
found that the state's failure to warn plaintiff of the boy's propensity for homicidal violence
was actionable negligence.
179. Lipman v. Brisbane Elem. School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, I Cal.
Rptr. 97, 99 (1961).
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Thus, the main judicial review provisions of the federal Administrative Procedures Act can serve as a guide in reviewing nontortious government action the provisions might read as follows:
Persons who suffer legal wrong because of governmental action and who seek relief other than money damages are entitled
to judicial review of the action.
Except where statutes preclude judicial review or an action
is committed to government discretion by law, courts shall hear
claims that the government or its agent acted or failed to act
in an official capacity or under color of legal authority."'
Finally, tribal waiver statutes should state specifically in which
courts to bring suit. A general waiver may be construed as waiving sovereign immunity in state and federal courts as well as tribal
courts; this may not be the desired result.
A few tribal legislative bodies have enacted ordinances defining the scope of sovereign immunity for their reservation. Most
tribes, however, have not taken legislative action. Recently, some
tribal courts have spoken on this issue; all but one have decided
that the doctrine applies on the reservation, either through ordinance or common law. All have indicated that the major common law exception to the doctrine, the "officer's suit," will apply as part of tribal law.
We hope this article will assist tribal councils and tribal courts
in exploring whether this doctrine should become, or remain, part
of the law of each tribal jurisdiction.

180. The scope of judicial review in this provision is substantially similar to the common law rule of Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

